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GLOBALIZING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
LINKAGE AND THE CHALLENGE OF A
JUSTICE-CONSTITUENCY
SAMUEL K. MURUMBA*

1. INTRODUCTION

There are historical moments in which invisible forces take a
perfectly good idea and turn it into an ideology or even an idol.
Such seems to be the case with intellectual property. Twenty
years ago, intellectual property hardly existed as such. Its individual components-copyrights, patents, trademarks, etc.-had been
around for a long time, of course, but they had not coalesced into
anything comparable to the unified body of law we have today.
Nor were they central to legal practice or significant to law school
curriculum. Indeed, as recently as the beginning of the 1980s, debate was still raging over the appropriate name to give to this
emerging field ("industrial property" or "intellectual property")
and over its precise boundaries. Almost overnight, however, intellectual property has changed from a complex and generally esoteric body of law-the preserve of specialists in technology and
entertainment law-to the stuff of folklore and conversation at
cocktail parties, and for some, almost an object of worship. Intellectual property now frequently appears in the company of such
lofty notions as freedom and democracy, and has even been hailed
as a more potent weapon than bombs and missiles for use against
dictators!**
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; LL.B. (Honors) (Makerere University, Kampala); LL.M.; Ph.D. (Monash University, Melbourne, Australia).
This paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law, International Economic Law Interest Group, Washington,
D.C., December 5, 1997. I am grateful for a comment by Frank Garcia and a
pointed critique by Peter Winship at this meeting; both prompted more reflection on some of the views presented there. A version of the paper was also presented at a Brooklyn Law School Center for the Study of International Business
Law's Economic Law Forum, Brooklyn Law School, April 22, 1998.
**Rebecca Mead expressed this point stating:

U.Pa. . Int'l Econ. L.

[Vol 19:2

As with all such things, several historical factors are responsible for this transformation, but the most significant is, I think,
evolution in the economic value behind property interests generally. The common law concept of property inaugurated by William the Conqueror, following his spectacular victory at the Battle of Hastings in 1066, saw the subject matter of property almost
exclusively in terms of land-real property-the foundation of
both political power and family wealth. With the Industrial
Revolution, the focus of property in the West shifted somewhat
to encompass not only land but manufactured goods as well. The
latter part of the twentieth century has seen another shift of emphasis from manufactured goods to ideas, information, and images-the subject matter of intellectual property-and it is this
shift that is largely responsible for the current elevation of intellectual property to its present lofty status.
The impetus for globalizing intellectual property laws, however, comes from the bewilderingly global nature of intellectual
property's subject matter, nicely illustrated by the country music
singer Johnny Cash's tale of woe before a Congressional subcommittee last fall. The source of Cash's anguish was that his hit
song, "Ring of Fire," had appeared on a website in Slovenia:
"Maybe I should be flattered that someone in Slovenia likes my
song, but when he or she makes it available to millions of people,

Saddam Hussein may have brought us back from the brink of war by
deciding to allow United Nations weapons inspectors access to his
contested presidential sites, but there are other violations that the Iraqi
premier has yet to rectify. That screening on Iraqi television of a bootleg copy of the movie"Wag the Dog," for a start: a few weeks ago, the
Iraqi public was treated to a grainy version of Barry Levinson's film,
presumably to illustrate that it is in the nature of an American President caught in a sex scandal to decide that a war overseas is exactly the
kind of distraction his country needs. Which raises the following
question: If we are not going to war with Iraq, could Saddam Hussein
nonetheless be nabbed on copyright law, just as Al Capone was caught
on tax evasion?
"This whole piracy situation is serious, because it represents a violation of property," Levinson said by telephone from Hollywood,
though he aided that he would probably not be pressuring New Line
Cinema to take action against Saddam ....

Rebecca Mead, A New Plan to Take Out Saddam Hussein, Courtesyof Hollywood,
NEW YORKER, Mar. 16, 1998, at 26-27.
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this hardly seems fair."' Cash told attentive members of the
House Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, "[In
real life], [o]ur laws respect what we create with our heads as
much as what we create with our hands," and "[that] ought to be
true [of] cyberspace too."2 Globalization of intellectual property's
subject matter is, of course, a product of the electronic revolution
which makes it possible for one to convert every kind of information-words, pictures, sounds-into the ones and zeros of digital
code,3 compress it, and transmit it to the ends of the earth with
only a few clicks of the mouse.
Information which has thus burst out of traditional territorial

confines can only be protected by rules which are similarly unconstrained, whose reach does not stop at the border. It requires,

some suggest, a system of global intellectual property as distinct
from the traditional internationalintellectual property. Interna-

tional intellectual property is a superstructure of norms that govern the relationship between autonomous, self-contained, and essentially territorial national intellectual property systems. A

global intellectual property system, by contrast, is one which

brings about deep integration4 of the various national systems into
a single, unified, global network. In this Article, I argue that a
global intellectual property of this kind is desirable, but that it involves a socio-ethical examination of near-Herculean proportions
into what would make such intellectual property laws work. I
shall suggest in Part 2 of this paper, however, that idolatry has set
in early and sabotaged that process: The result is not deep integration at all, but a hurriedly constructed system whose only
foundation is a thin bargain linkage between trade and intellectual

property. In Parts 3 and 4, 1 shall probe the competing theoretical
challenges that I have called "glib universalism" and "postmodern
culturalism" which a system of deep integration needs to confront. In Part 5, I suggest that the answer to the challenge of
' Rebecca Vesely, Johnny Cash Talks the Line on Coyright Law, WIRED
NEWS (visited May 5, 1998) <http://www.wired.com/newspolitcs/story/69

71.htm

>.

2 Id.

3 See generally ESTHER DYSON, RELEASE 2.0, 133-34 (1997); PAUL
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 196, 196-236 (3d ed. 1994) (stating that "[o]ne of the transforming sci-

entific revolutions of the twentieth century has been to capture words, sounds,
and images in digital form").
See infra notes 5-13 and accompanying text.
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global intellectual property is neither disembodied universal
norms applied in the same way everywhere and without regard
for context or local circumstance, nor the construction of a global
culture, but lies in the more modest concept of a "justice constituency."
2. GLOBALIZING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:

Is ANYTHING NEW?

As I use the term in this paper, globalization in relation to the
subject matter of intellectual property means instantaneous projection of information all over the globe. In relation to the law, it
means the deep integration necessary for a unified global normative system. In both cases, globalization is, in my view, qualitatively different from internationalization,a term I use here for the
occasional traversing of state borders by essentially territorial information, and the relatively modest laws designed to accommodate such modest border-crossings.
Internationalization is no stranger to intellectual property.
From earliest times, the kind of information protected by intellectual property-for instance,, works of literature and patented
inventions-has always had an international dimension in the
sense of crossing national borders. The international intellectual
property law designed for this process is also of venerable origin,
dating back to the nineteenth century. It is found in treaties such
as the Paris Convention, created in 1883 to deal with patents,
trademarks and industrial designs, and the premier copyright
treaty, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Artistic and
Literary Works, established six years later in 1889. With a few
exceptions, however, these treaties did not create substantive universal intellectual property rules. They were content, for the
most part, to prescribe the more modest principle of "national
treatment"-the requirement that each member state accord
works of nationals of other member states the same rights as those
accorded the works of its own nationals. The substantive standards of protection and the procedures for effecting that protection were, largely, left to the autonomy of each member state.
National treatment means that an author who is a national of one
member country must not be treated any worse in another member country than authors who are nationals of that other country;
but this does not mean that authors must receive identical treatment in each member country. Internationalintellectual property

1998]
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law is thus not incompatible with the territorial nature of traditional intellectual property laws.
It is in the context of truly global norms, however, that
Johnny Cash's complaint about the fate of his song in Slovenia
could be vindicated. What would such territory-transcending
rules look like? Although there are modest universal minimum
standards in international treaties, such as the Berne Convention,
there are really two kinds of territory-transcending intellectual
property laws, and both are of recent origin.
2.1.

Super 301: The Realist Option

The first kind is the "realist" one. It involves the unilateral,
extra-territorial enforcement of one nation's laws-for instance
the laws of the United States-against countries that do not respect the intellectual property of its nationals. This option is often invoked as a measure of last resort against the most egregious
offenders, such as those sometimes described as "one-copy countries"-countries where piracy is so rampant that a single legitimate copy of a computer program or a musical CD is all it takes
to satisfy the needs of the entire population! An example of such
unilateral measures is the United States' "Super (or Special) 301"§ 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 19885which enables the United States to take retaliatory action against
countries with inadequate intellectual property laws. Since one
nation's laws have no normative force beyond its territory, the
external shape of "Super 301" is that of sheer economic muscle.
That is the sense in which it might be called "realist." But it
might have venerable philosophical roots in the claim of all states
to protect the interests of their nationals abroad. Unilateral
measures of this sort are built on what we might call a retaliatory
linkage: "Protect our national's intellectual property or else."
Since Johnny Cash's complaint was made to a Congressional Subcommittee, it could indeed be perceived as an aggrieved citizen's
invocation of the realist option. Cash, however, wanted this done
through the mediation of recent WIPO treaties. He was lending
5 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. S 2901
(1998).
6 See World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20,
1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65; World Intellectual Property
Organization Performance and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M.

76.
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his voice not to a powerful state's unilateral commands against an
offending weaker one, but to the creation of overarching global
rules of the kind Kratochwil describes as rules in the "third party
mode."7 These global rules are the second option for a territorytranscending intellectual property system and it is to them that I
turn.
2.2.

Rules in the "ThirdPartyMode": TRIPS and the Road
TowardDeep Integration

Intellectual property's most dramatic step from its international phase towards the global one came with the TRIPS Agreement that was part of the GATT Uruguay Round. The TRIPS
Agreement did this, in the first instance, by "legislating" beyond
the traditional notions of national treatment (albeit with some
modest minimum standards) to strong substantive as well as procedural norms; in the second instance, by making such
"legislation" universal using a linkage to trade to ensure that everyone is either on board or soon will be; and in the third instance
by creating an institutional structure in the World Trade Organization ("WTO") to ensure compliance with these norms. The
substantive norms create a variety of universal minimum standards of protection, such as those requiring computer programs to
be protected as literary works under the Berne Convention, or
provisions relating to rental rights, performers' rights, wellknown marks or the patent term; procedural norms ensure their
enforcement through such mechanisms as injunctions, seizure,
and, in some cases, even criminal penalties; and the WTO superimposes upon these a transcendent institutional structure.
We have already noted that one of the causes of the shift from
internationalto global intellectual property is the electronic revolution mentioned earlier; in addition, this shift is also attributable
both to the progressive transfer of autonomy from states to markets, as well as to the world's industrial leaders' desire to sustain
high-cost labor economies through the sales of their advanced
ideas.' What may not be so well known, however, are the pro7 See FRIEDRICH KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON
THE CONDITIONS OF PRACTICAL AND LEGAL REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS 13 (1989).
8 See W.R. Cornish, Judicial Legislation, in LAW, SOCIETY, AND
ECONOMY: CENTENARY ESSAYS FOR THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 1895-1995 359, 371 (Richard Rawlings ed., 1997).
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found implications of this shift, including for instance the spectacular measures of harmonization a treaty like the TRIPS
Agreement has imposed upon its 120-odd member states, 9 nor the
way this treaty may give a foreigner a second chance at litigation-in the form of international litigation-as a means of procuring private rights that could not be procured through direct
negotiation. 10 As a keen observer further notes:
The particular point to be made in today's context is that
the dispute will be settled by a tribunal of three, of suitably balanced composition. In the early years the panel
members are likely to be drawn from those government
9 See id
10 An interesting scenario is sketched out by Cornish:
Imagine for instance a dispute over whether a copyright computer
program can be the subject of reverse engineering by "decompilation"
in order to produce a compatible, non-infringing program. This will
first be litigated through the instances of the country where infringement is alleged. If it is an EC country there will doubtless be a cassational side-trip to the European Court of Justice in order to determine
the meaning of the ludicrously complicated Directive on the subject.
If it all goes against the plaintiff, that claimant may cause its government to institute proceedings against the refusing State, claiming that
under TRIPS no exception is permissible because the reverse engineering prejudices the interests of the right-owner. If the outcome is in favour of the plaintiff's State, it may in its turn insist upon the withdrawal of trade concessions under the GATT which will hurt enough
to induce a change in the copyright law.
Indeed after five years it will be possible to raise such a dispute on
the basis of prejudicial conduct which escapes violating the actual
terms of TRIPS. I have even seen it suggested that, if a country (such
as France) chooses to impose a quota on the television showing of foreign films (inevitably American), the copyright owners of the latter
w ll be able to argue from TRIPS that the embargo is impermissible.
Forget the fact that copyright itself is a negative right designed to prevent others from using pirated or unlicensed copies for sales or performances; it is not concerned with the copyright owner's or licensee's
exploitation of its own material. Forget the fct that negotiations on
quotas in the audio-visual sector broke down and nothing was included
in the new GATT on the provision of material for broadcasting. It
would be enough that some essential spirit of TRIPS had been dishonoured.
Whether such a claim would ever finally be sustained in a WTO dispute settlement claim is wholly speculative. It is the possibility that it
can even be contemplated which should be a cause of considerable
concern in the new world of trade collaboration.
Id. at 372-73.
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negotiators who generated the TRIPs in midnight enclaves, people steeped in the esoteric power-politics of that
process, rather than philosophers of the role and purpose
of the rights. The Dispute Settlement Panels will work at
a total remove from the political institutions of either the
State under attack or the attacking State. The settlement
could well adopt an activist approach to interpretation of
the TRIPs text. It could perhaps rely on some common
heritage of international customary law in intellectual
property matters, for which certain high-thinking groups
are even now seeking recognition. Whatever the outcome,
a settlement will have immense influence: it will establish
the essential content of the laws on the subject in well-nigh
all States."
Such are the profound implications of a global intellectual
property system, and at the formal rule-making level this edifice is
a formidable achievement.' 2 The tough terrain, however, lies
ahead, for the degree of harmonization which this formal set of
rules, along with the exigencies of their interpretation by a single
body requires, may turn out to be far more than most parties bargained for. It is the kind of deep integration which rides roughshod over not only the strong dualism that seeks to keep treaties
and domestic law separate in countries such as Great Britain and
Scandinavia, but also in those such as the United States where the
legislature plays some role in the treaty-making process and where
many intellectual property rules may differ from those of other
countries. My principal point is that a deep integration of this
kind cannot be sustained by idolatry, or by bargain linkage. Can
such an integration be built on a firmer foundation? Possibly yes,
but only after one has dealt with the intractable problems raised
by two warring camps that inhabit the treacherous conceptual
terrain just below the surface of formal rules. I have called the
first, "glib universalism." Despite the use of the adjective "glib" to
describe this position, mine is really an attempt to put some theoretical flesh on the bare bones of the current system; it is an at"
12

Id. at 373.
For an overview of the implementation of the Uruguay Round see generally, JOHN H. JACKSON & ALAN O. SYKES, IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY
ROUND (1997).
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tempt to give the most sympathetic account of the quest for universal rules that have no regard for context or circumstance.
Moreover, for the most part, these rules are simply national ones
shorn of their domestic socio-ethical roots-disembodied norms
orbiting in global space. The second camp, the exact opposite of
"glib universalism," is postmodernity's "vision of a cultural
'heterotopia' which has no edges, hierarchies or centre"13 and
which is anathema to the very possibility of universal norms. I
suggest, however, that there is a way out of the unpalatable choice
between the tyranny of disembodied norms and the intransigence
of postmodern culturalism. That way out, I suggest, lies in the
notion of a "justice-constituency" which I shall sketch in the latter
part of this Article. But first, let us elaborate on the rival visions
of glib universalism and postmodern culturalism.
3. GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GLIB UNIVERSALISM

I have attributed the factual globalization of intellectual property to three causal factors: the electronic revolution, the triumph of the market, and the perceived interests of industrialized
nations. The phenomenon I have called glib universalism is an attempt to put some normative foundations underneath this process. The glib universalist camp draws its strength from a curious
collusion of two old enemies: naturalism and legal positivism.
Let us look at the contributions of each to their joint venture of
providing a normative foundation for global intellectual property.
3.1.

Naturalism

As already mentioned, intellectual property rights may acquire both a canonical status and presumptive universality by
donning the garb of natural or human rights. Human rights are
universal because they are rights which all human beings everywhere have by virtue of their humanity. As Professor Henkin
reminds us:
[Such rights] do not differ with geography or history, culture or ideology, political or economic system, or stage of
societal development. To call them "human" implies that
13STEVEN CONNOR, POSTMODERN CULTURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
(1989).

THEORIFS OF THE CONTEMPORARY 19
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all human beings have them, equally and in equal measure,
by virtue of their humanity-regardless of sex, race, age;
regardless of high or low "birth," social class, national origin, ethnic or tribal affiliation; regardless of wealth or
poverty, occupation talent, merit, religion, ideology, or
other commitment.'4
The view of intellectual property rights as fundamental human rights is, of course, no idle curiosity. Although this may not
be widely known, Article 27(2) of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights-that central pillar of the International Bill of
Rights whose fiftieth anniversary we celebrate this year-affirms
the right of everyone "to the protection of the moral and material
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he [or she] is the author."15 Moreover, while the
general right of property did not make it to the subsequent treaties, intellectual property rights did find their way into the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
which contains a similar provision.
This naturalistic elevation of intellectual property rights to the
status of universal human rights has reached new and surprising
heights in the oft-repeated description of unauthorized copying
and distribution of the protected works as "piracy," for pirates,
along with torturers and slave traders, are among the most egregious violators of human rights. As Judge Kaufman of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit described them,
the torturer, the pirate, and the slave trader are each hostis humani
generis, an enemy of all humankind. 17 Yet, despite its superficial
rhetorical value which thrives on hyperbolic inflation of intellectual property's universal moral claims, the naturalistic view is unlikely to provide an enduring normative foundation for global in14 Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 2-3 (1990).
15 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 27(2),
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
16 Article 15(1)(c) provides that "[tlhe States Parties... recognise the right
of everyone.., to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is
the author." International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, art. 15(1)(c), 993 U.N.T.S. 3; see also American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man, art. 13, at 19, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser. L/V/ll. Doc.
6 (May 2, 1948), available in 9 I.L.M. 673.
17 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
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tellectual property. For a start, no one is likely to mistake Judge
Kaufman's characterization of the "pirate" as hostis humani generis
for a reference to purveyors of bootleg compact discs or computer
programs. But more importantly, intellectual property has another handicap, not shared by tangible property, which makes its
status as the subject of fundamental human rights more tenuous:
The case for its protection is notoriously counterintuitive. This is
due, in turn, to what one may call intellectual property's "double
intangibility."
For instance, although both lawyers and lay persons habitually draw a distinction between tangible and intangible property,
and between corporeal and incorporeal hereditaments, all property is in truth intangible. This is because by "property," we
really mean "proprietary interests." These are complex socio-legal
constructs involving relationships between "persons" (natural,
corporate, etc.) and "objects" (tangible or intangible) giving rise to
a particular kind of rights (rights in rem whose content is typically exclusive use and alienation). In this regard, the distinction
between tangible and intangible property, or the historical one
between corporeal and incorporeal hereditaments, is, in terms of
their "propertyness," conceptually erroneous; for every proprietary interest-whether it be a fee simple, a lease, an easement, a
mortgage-is ex hypothesi intangible. Now within the general
category of proprietary interests, there are some that have as their
subject matter, tangible "things" such as houses, automobiles, or
furniture; their case for the protection is intuitively self-evident
because they are prototypical property in the sense that they can
be possessed. Other proprietary interests, however, are saddled
with the further intangibility of their subject matter; such is the
case with intellectual property whose subject matter consists of
literary works, music, inventions-namely, information. Intellectual property is thus doubly intangible: First, by virtue of its
"propertyness," and second, because its subject matter is also intangible.
This curse of double intangibility makes the case for the protection of intellectual property counterintuitive for two reasons.
The first reason is that it makes them "inappropriable." Basic
proprietary interests in tangible objects are intuitively underwritten by their amenability to appropriation: They can be removed
from the public domain for all to see, possessed-and possession
in all its many-splendoured complexity is a prototypical defining

U.Pa. . Int'lEcon. L.
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attribute of ownership both in the law and in the mind. As one
writer has put it:
We cannot have our fish both loose and fast, as Melville
might have said, and the common law of first possession
makes a choice. The common law gives preference to
those who convince the world that they have caught the
fish and hold it fast. This may be a reward to useful labor,
but it is more precisely the articulation of a specific vocabulary within a structure of symbols approved and understood by a commercial people. It is this commonly
understood and shared set of symbols that gives significance and form to what might seem the quintessential individualist act: the claim that one has, by "possession,"
separated for oneself
property from the great commons of
18
unowned things.
Information, the subject matter of intellectual property, however, is not appropriable in this way. It is only of value in the
marketplace, but once released there, it can easily be replicated
and used by the whole world. Although this "inappropriability"
is normally worked into a utilitarian reason for legal protection of
intellectual property,' 9 it does render the naturalistic claim hopelessly counterintuitive. Appropriability is not just a fetish of human intuition. It also serves the valuable function of defining the
boundaries of each person's private domain. For this reason, a
distinction is often made between "choses in possession" (i.e. chattels) and "choses in action" (e.g. a patent, copyright, or debt). The
general idea is that choses in possession can be possessed and enjoyed without more ado, whereas enjoyment of choses in action
may require the assistance of some further legal action.
The second reason for the counterintuitiveness of protecting
intellectual property is what has been called "non-rivalrous" consumption.20 The consumption of a tangible thing deprives others
Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
73, 88 (1985).
19 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND
18

RELATED STATE DOCTRINES: CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 6-7 (4th ed. 1997).
20 See CRAIG JOYCE ETAL., COPYRIGHT LAW 18 n.28 (2d ed. 1991).
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of it, but the use or enjoyment of information, ideas, and works
of art does not deprive anyone else. For instance, a television signal carrying a musical work can be broadcast to the whole world
and "consumed" by everyone who has the equipment to receive
it, without anyone getting any less of it. Like inappropriability,
this unique characteristic of informational goods-that anyone
can use them without diminishing their availability to anyone
else-leads to a powerful moral intuition against intellectual property law.2
In addition to inappropriability and non-rivalrous consumption, there are also counterintuitive reasons of a more cultural
kind against intellectual property. For instance, understandings
of notions such as authorship and the construction of the public
domain provide an example. All these make it doubtful that the
naturalistic exaltation of intellectual property claims to the status
of fundamental human rights can settle any significant normative
issues between Johnny Cash and the inhabitants of Slovenia. Let
us turn then to the positivist component of glib universalism.
3.2.

The PositivistComponent

The positivist element of this duo consists of excessive faith in
the formal rules of law, separate and apart from law's socio-ethical
ecology. I call this one positivist because it has its roots in legal
positivism's obsession with the "separability" thesis, which insists
that law can and should be separable from its social context. The
positivist's misplaced faith in legal rules divorced from context is,
in part, a consequence of law's effectiveness in the domestic
sphere. We observe that in the domestic sphere, intellectual
property law generally works quite well, and from this observation we intuitively extrapolate that a set of formal rules would
work just as well at the global level. Most of the rules of the
emerging global system are, indeed, directly transposed from national legal systems.
But we delude ourselves. There is no easy correlation between
law's effectiveness in the domestic sphere and its chances of success in the global arena. Whatever critical legal scholars 2 and

21

See GOLDSTEIN, supranote 19, at 7.
For a liberal critique of this movement, see ANDREW ALTMAN,

CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQuE (1990); a broader account of

all such movements is discussed and chronicled in GARY MINDA, POST-
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other anti-formalists might say, formal intellectual property rules
have worked pretty well in the domestic sphere. But law's success
in the domestic sphere, far from predicting its effectiveness at the
universal level, augers ill for universality since both law's domestic success and its floundering at the universal level may be due to
the common feature of embeddedness at the heart of law's ontology.
At the national level, formal rules work because they are part
of a complex web of social conventions and practices. These social conventions and practices in which law is embedded are for
the most part invisible; that may be why positivism tends to pay
scant attention to them. In everyday life, we are oblivious to
them the way we are oblivious to other aspects of our ecology,
until something disturbs them. But these social practices exist and
without them formal rules would be well nigh impossible. This
embeddedness is not unique to law; it pervades all institutional
facts of which law is only one kind. In his book which explores
the ontology of such institutional facts, John Searle uses a simple
scene to illustrate the immense complexity of the web of social
facts I talk about here.23 The scene involves a visit to a caf6 in
Paris where he utters a fragment of a French sentence by which
he orders a beer. The waiter brings him the beer, he drinks it,
leaves some money on the table, and departs. But, as Searle remarks, the sheer simplicity of this scene belies the fact that "its
metaphysical complexity is truly staggering" 24 (Searle believes that
its "complexity would have taken Kant's breath away if he had
bothered to think about such things").25 In particular, this simple
transaction is embedded in a bewildering web of social facts.
There is hardly anything in this scene which can be adequately
described in the language of physics or chemistry--not
"restaurant," "waiter," "sentence of French," "money," nor even
"chair" and "table." Moreover, beyond these things that have
some physical existence, the scene is brimming with what Searle

MODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S
END (1995).
(9 See
(1995).
24
25

JOHN SEARLE, THE CONsTRucTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 3-4

Id. at 3.

rd.
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describes as "a huge, invisible ontology."26 He outlines this ontology as follows:
The waiter did not actually own the beer he gave me, but
he is employed by the restaurant which owned it. The
restaurant is required to post a list of the prices of all the
boissons, and even if I never see such a list, I am required to
pay only the listed price. The owner of the restaurant is
licensed by the French government to operate it. As such,
he is subject to a thousand rules and regulations I know
nothing about.27
Yet, as Searle points out, we can bear the staggering metaphysical
burden of this social reality because it is largely "weightless and
invisible."28 Once we are brought up in a particular culture, its
web of social reality seems no less natural than physical trees or
water. It is this complex web of social reality in which domestic
rules of law are embedded.
There is, however, hardly any corresponding set of social reality to underwrite the proliferating rules of intellectual property
we are sending into global orbit. For the most part these are disembodied domestic norms, unhinged from their socio-ethical context, floating in space. It is a mistake to believe that since they
worked so well in the domestic sphere, they will work well at the
global level too, for the socio-ethical reality they have left behind
is essential to both their meaning and effectiveness.
The universalist sub-component is intertwined with both the
naturalist and the legal positivist ones just discussed, but its main
flaw is not so much the former's claim of intuitive self-evidence
nor the latter's excessive faith in formal rules severed from their
socio-ethical context. Its particular sin is that of succumbing to
the seduction of easy universality. The point here is not that universal norms are altogether unattainable.2 9 It is rather that out26
27

Id.
id

Id. at 4.
29 In matters of human rights generally, I am an unrepentant universalist
myself. See, e.g., Samuel K. Murumba, Cross-CulturalDimensions of Human
Rights in the Twenty.First Century, in LEGAL VISIONS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
28
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side certain contexts, universality is extremely difficult to attain,
and without satisfying some rigorous pre-conditions, a complete

impossibility.
The allure of universal intellectual property norms that do not
vary with change in place or local circumstance is, in the final
analysis, the seduction of what Sir Isaiah Berlin once referred to as
"a system of propositions so general, so clear, so comprehensive,

connected with each other with logical links so unambiguous and
direct that the result resembles as closely as possible a deductive
system."30 It is at bottom a utopian aspiration, though the world
of markets in which intellectual property rights operate is a rather

curious abode for utopian ideas. Nevertheless, the "global market" and its accouterments, including intellectual property rights,
has been invested with some utopian characteristics by those who
see in it the panacea for all the ills of the post-cold war world.31
Indeed, it is not unusual these days to encounter discussions
linking intellectual property, especially copyright, with
"democracy," 32 and global copyright with "a vision of global derumba, The Cultural and Conceptual Basis of Human Rights in International
Law (1986) (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Monash University (Melbourne, Australia) on file with the Monash University Library).
30 ISAIAH BERLIN, THIE SENSE OF REALITY 21 (Henry Hardy ed., 1996).
31 The kind of utopianism associated with the global market is sometimes
referred to as a version of "high modernism" which previously used to idolize

the state. See

JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE THE STATE: How CERTAIN
SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDmON HAVE FAILED (1998); John
Gray, The Best-Laid Plans,N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Apr. 19, 1998, at 36.

As I finished this book, I realized that its critique of certain forms of
state action might seem, from the post-1989 perspective of capitalist
triumphalism, like a kind of quaint archaeology. States with the iretensions and power that I criticize have for the most part vanishe or
have drastically curbed their ambitions. And yet, as I make clear...
large-scale capitalism is just as much an agency of homogenization, uniformity, grids, and heroic simplification as the state is ....As we shall
see, the conclusions that can -bedrawn from failures of modern projects of social engineering are as applicable to market-drivenstandardization as they are to bureaucratichomogeneity.
SCOTT, supra, at 7-8 (emphasis added).
32 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society,
106 YALE L.J. 283, 288 (1996) (arguing that "copyright is in essence a state
measure that uses market institutions to enhance the democratic character of
civil society"); see also Neil Weinstock Netanel,Asserting Copyright'sDemocratic
Principalsin the Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217, 220 (1998) [hereinafter
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mocracy, not merely global markets,"333
4 or with what sounds like

an oxymoron, "freedom imperialism."
Whether a global intellectual property system can have such
profound socio-political implications remains to be seen. What
that lofty inquiry should not obscure, however, is the more modest question of whether such a global system is capable of achieving the more traditional goal of all intellectual property systemsthe balancing of incentives and rewards to authors and inventors
against the public's right of free access to works and information.
We have seen that global intellectual property rules are generally abstracted from domestic spheres, leaving behind their sustaining contextual information. In place of these sustaining contexts, the global system of rules has relied more and more on
linkages in order to persuade countries that would otherwise be
reluctant to protect intellectual property (because such a protection is a net loss to them) to come on board. For instance, a
country may accede to the global intellectual property system because that is a condition of its obtaining access to markets for its
manufactured products. Bargain linkages of this sort may create
a system of rules, but they are unlikely to sustain it. Moreover,
such bargain linkages tell us nothing about the content of the
global rules they helped create. They do not tell us much, for instance, about the meaning of "weasel" words like "fair use" and
"originality" in copyright law, "novelty" and "non-obviousness"
in patent law, or "distinctiveness" and "deceptive similarity" in
trademark law. They are, in other words, only creating what
Neil MacCormick calls "rule-texts," but hardly any "rulecontent."15 The trouble lies in the content of all these expansively
indeterminate terms. For global intellectual property, the devil
lurks in the details.

Netanel, Democratic Principals] ('Copyright law serves fundamentally to underwrite a democratic culture.").
3 Netanel, DemocraticPrincipals,supra note 32, at 221.
31 See Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPs Agreement: Imperialistic,Outdated,
and Overprotective,20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613, 615-20 (1996).
35 See Neil MacCormick, On "Open Texture" in Law, in CONTROVERSIES
ABOUT LAw's ONTOLOGY 72, 79-82 (Paul Amselek & Neil MacCormick eds.,
1991).
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GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
POSTMODERN CULTURISM

Glib universalism, as just observed, involves the use of controversial naturalist or positivist-universalist foundations to underwrite a global intellectual property system. Its nemesis, the
postmodern-culturalist camp, holds that the universality of norms
espoused in the global law-making enterprise is, at best, an exercise in futility, and at worst, a fraud.
The basis for this rather startling claim can be found in a
complex arsenal of ontological, epistemological, and ethical tenets
of various strengths. The general target of this arsenal is a set of
related notions generally attributed to the Enlightenment, the
most important of which are: rationality, objectivity and universality. Postmodern culturalism insists that these notions are implausible because there is no Archimedian perspective-no view
from above, or from the sidelines, that transcends the particularities of culture, space, and history. Rather, this camp insists that
every perspective is made from within some cultural perspective.
Instead of pretensions of rationality, universality, objectivity, (for
some even philosophy itself) this movement proposes that we
substitute the language of emotions and poetry.
These claims
have profound implications for the whole project of creating a
system of global intellectual property rules. Without rationality,
we could not have any rules or principles at all, 37 or at any rate,
rules and principles that are not simply "resources and instruments that individuals manipulate to get what they want or think
good" or that "exert no power.., of their own over individual
thought, desire, and action"-in other words, rules that are not
"mere words," as one strand of postmodernism, the Critical Legal
Studies Movement, might regard them.3 1 Without objectivity, we
would have trouble talking about the ontology of law as a set of
social practices that do really exist in the way illustrated earlier
with the example of Searle's visit to a French caf. 39 Without
universality, we could not talk about the possibility of having a
36

See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 373-

94 (1979).
37 See ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 40 (1993)
(discussing the role of principles in rationality and arguing that "to act and
think rationally, one must do so in accordance with principles").
38 ALTMAN, supra note 22, at 151.
39 See SEARLE, supra note 23, at 3-4.
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system of universal intellectual property at all. So if postmodern
claims about rationality, objectivity, or universality are true, then
those trying to globalize intellectual property are truly whistling
in the wind.
That seems bad enough. The postmodern project, however, is
not simply about ontology (or what exists) nor simply about epistemology. It is, above all, about ethics in the broadest sense. It
tells the story of what ought to be done, and much of the attack
on the rationality, objectivity, and universality that it has attributed to the Enlightenment is really strategic. The ethical claim
here is that these lofty Enlightenment notions are really the building blocks of an ideology that makes injustice invisible and thus
allows it to thrive by masking endemic inequality in the general
allocation of burdens and benefits. In the present context there is
4
a growing body of literature known as anti-colonial scholarship 0
which sees the global economy, and everything from global intellectual property rules to global human rights principles, as a neoliberal attempt to adapt the traditional colonial legacy of NorthSouth inequality to the Information Age, a role previously performed by the notion of an international division of labor in the
Industrial Age.
As a counter to this perceived deleterious import of an absolute, monistic system of norms, postmodernism proposes the
competing vision of "legal polycentricity" which rejects the single
value approach to questions of law and morals.41 Legal polycentricity is predicated upon an acceptance, indeed a celebration, of
cultural pluralism.
Like the universalist one, the postmodern vision contains
valuable lessons for the global law-making enterprise. Most of
these lessons can be gleaned from some of the deficiencies of the
universalist vision already observed. However, the postmodern
vision has some serious problems. One of these is that its antiuniversalist stance glosses over the reality of the increasing proximity among cultures at the end of the twentieth century. With
proximity comes cross-cultural exchange, a routine feature of all
cultures and value-systems, which tends to homogenize the landscape. It has been suggested that, historically, this proximity beFor an excellent review of this scholarship see James Thuo Gathii,InternationalLaw andEurocentricity,9 EUR. J. INT'LL. 182-209 (1998).
See SURYA PRAKASH SINHA, LEGAL POLYCENTRICITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-14 (1996).
41
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tween cultures has tended to lead to the dominant culture seeking
to swallow up the minority cultures. 42 In response to this threat,
the minority cultures developed, as a defensive mechanism, a deliberate "counter identity" that resists translation. This defensive
non-translatability is sometimes referred to as "secondary pseudospeciation" and results in an identity based on normative selfdefinition. But today, mutual translation among cultures into
larger networks of communication is inevitable. In any event, the
cultural "heterotopia," which some versions of postmodernism
espouse, is implausible because it is predicated upon strong pluralism which entails the very overarching normative universe that
postmodernist culturalism had initially hoped to repudiate. Consequently, postmodern culturalism does not, in the end, negate
the possibility of global intellectual property, though it does alert
us to some pitfalls we might be able to avoid along the way.
5. A JUSTICE-CONSTITUENCY FOR GLOBAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY?

We have just described two rival visions fighting for control
over the project of globalizing intellectual property: The positivist-universalist vision of disembodied, sui generis norms floating
awkwardly in global space; and the postmodern-culturalist vision
of a "heterotopia" of cultures that is anathema to the very possibility of a universal law. I suggested that both are delusions: the
first because of its naturalistic intuitionism or excessive faith in legalism without regard to the context that makes law possible; the
second because of what we might call a kind of cultural solipsism.
Both visions are flawed for another reason. They are predicated upon a world that is rapidly unraveling, a world of autonomous, discrete entities, whether one calls these states or cultures.
The universalist vision derives global rules from "a trade paradigm," the language of trade being a kind of "pidgin" that makes
communication across the void between sovereign states possible.
It is this paradigm which makes excessive reliance on legal rules so
attractive. The postmodern-culturalist vision speaks the language
of cultures rather than states, but it also relies upon statism more
than it realizes: For, in practice, the constructs of states and cul42 See Jan Assman, Translating Gods: Religion as a Factor of Cultural
(Un)Translatability,in THE TRANSLATABILITY OF CULTURES: FIGURATIONS
OF THE SPACE BETWEEN 25, 29 (Sanford Budick & Wolfgang Iser eds., 1996).
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tures tend to collapse into each other. Thus both universalist and
culturalist visions share a common premise of global law as international law-as law between nations-and more specifically as
public international law. In this paradigm, the only other version
of a global order would be that of a supra-national order in the
form of a world government. Although states have not withered
away, their influence has diminished considerably while the private sphere's influence continues to expand. This is the globalization of the market, of the private sector, for which states increasingly only play the role of facilitator.
Within national jurisdictions, linkages between law and other
disciplines, such as economics or psychology or sociology, operate
upon a pre-existing sub-stratum of socio-ethical facts. Since there
is no corresponding contextual equivalent of these at the global
level, linkages here cannot play this (their usual) role. At the
global level, linkages, instead, tend to play the role of bargaining
tools as in the case of the linkage between trade and intellectual
property epitomized by the TRIPS Agreement. Or, they play the
role of surrogate "contexts" for global intellectual property, precariously inhabiting the intermediate space between the two rival
visions above.
I suggest, however, that this is not the most profitable role for
linkages. First, whatever little "context" linkages might give
global laws here occurs at the same delirious level of abstraction as
to be of little practical value. Second, they share most of the pathologies of the rational choice theories in which they are
grounded.43 But in any event their role here is premised upon a
false dilemma: The view that we are doomed to choose between
the futility of disembodied norms and the intransigence of postmodern culturalism. I suggest that the contextual problem for
global intellectual property norms, however, is really that of a
"justice-constituency."
As I use it here, the phrase "justiceconstituency" signifies something more "contextual" than natural43 See DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
1994); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 3-8
1997).
4See JULIUS STONE, VISIONS OF WORLD ORDER: BETWEEN STATE
POWER AND HUMAN JUSTICE 95-101 (1984). On Stone's general approach to
international law, see generally James Crawford, Realism, Scepticism and the Future World Order: Some Thoughts on Julius Stone's Contributionto International
Law, 13 SYDNEY L. REV. 475 (1991).
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ist or legalist universalism but less all-embracing than culture. It
refers to that consensus and those articulated or implicit understandings that make law's allocation of benefits and burdens, as
well as its designation of claimants and beneficiaries, acceptable,
or at least tolerable. Delineating and articulating a justiceconstituency for world-wide intellectual property laws is admittedly no easy task: It is indisputably harder than the currently
popular game of launching into orbit de-contextualized norms
strung on thin bargain linkages; but it is also much less daunting
than a complete creation of an all-embracing global culture. A
global justice-constituency recognizes the embeddedness of law
without engaging in all-embracing models of such embeddedness.
A few short years ago, the possibility of a global justiceconstituency might have, with good reason, been described as the
craziest delusion of them all. A world of private rights and duties
stretching across state boundaries, rights, and duties not belonging
to states would have been almost inconceivable. This is because
barriers to "communication across state frontiers and the related
operations of the state entity in inhibiting, molding, and distorting the formation and articulation of human claims, aspirations,
and expectations as well as the transmission and reception of
communications"45 would have made the sociological and other
inquiries necessary for articulating such a global justice constituency impossible. But the world on the threshold of the twentyfirst century looks increasingly different. It is a world where state
boundaries, though by no means non-existent, have lost much of
their effectiveness across a wide-range of human communication,
especially trade and the movement of capital. It is also a world
which is ripe for the principled construction of a justiceconstituency. This is a pre-condition for the kind of "deep integration" which notions such as a "global market" entail.
The first step in the construction of that justice-constituency is
the abandonment of "naturalistic" language now predominant in
universal intellectual property discussions. As we saw at the beginning, naturalistic claims ultimately rest on the grounds of intuition or self-evidence. But as already mentioned, protection of
intellectual property is notoriously counterintuitive, especially
because it involves non-rivalrous consumption. When use or
"consumption" of a novel or song by one person, or a billion
45 STONE, supra note 44, at 41; Crawford, supra note 44, at 487.
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people does not leave any less novel or song for the enjoyment of
the other four billion people on the planet, intellectual property
protection looks suspiciously like depriving people of something
to which they should have unfettered access. As Justice Brandeis
said, in his dissenting opinion, in InternationalNews Service v. AssociatedPress, "The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions-knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions,
and ideas-become, after voluntary communication to others, free
as the air to common use." 46 But no one could say it more eloquently than Thomas Jefferson:
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all
others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the
moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of
every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it.
Its peculiar character, too, I that no one possess the less,
because every other possess the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives instructions himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. That ideas should
freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the
moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of
his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like fire,
expansible over all space, without lessening their density in
any point, and like the air in which we breathe, move and
have our physical being,
incapable of confinement or ex47
clusive appropriation.
Yet, as already mentioned, it is equally true that the subject
matter of intellectual property is plagued by "inappropriability"
by its author: The author needs to disseminate her work in order
to profit from it, but once released, she cannot control its exploiInternational News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918).
(Lipscomb ed.,
1904) (Letter to I. McPherson, Aug. 13, 1813), quoted in RAUPH BROWN &
ROBERT DENICOLA, COPYRiGHT 9 (6th ed. 1995).
46

47 THIRTEEN WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 333-34
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tation. Moreover, with the advent of modern technology, duplication produces copies of perfect quality at almost no cost; there
now exists the means to distribute them to the whole world at the
click of a mouse. There is thus little economic incentive for
authors to take the trouble to create works, and every incentive to
wait and duplicate those created by others. An intellectual property system is needed to strike a careful balance between the public's rights of access to works and the intellectual property
owner's incentive and reward for giving society something of
value. This is the utilitarian or economic basis for our intellectual
property law mentioned earlier. The utilitarian basis is memorably enshrined in the United States Constitution which gives Congress the power "[to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
48
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
This provision provides the back-drop for our elaborate system of
copyright and patent concepts-such as originality, ideaexpression dichotomy, and "fair use" in copyright laws, and
"novelty" and "non-obviousness" in patent law, as well as an array
of limitations on the scope of rights and compulsory licenses.
The same balance between private rights and public benefits is
struck in a different way for trademarks using such notions as deception and distinctiveness-which reflect the nature of the
trademark as an information device-but that also rests principally on a utilitarian premise, not a natural rights one. The economic or utilitarian rationale has often been reiterated by the
courts at the highest level as in Sony Corp. ofAmerica v. Universal
Studios, Inc.:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means
by which an important public purpose may be achieved.
It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors
and inventors by the provision of a special reward ....

" U.S. CONST. art. I, 9 8, ci. 8.
49 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429

(1984).
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The first challenge for a global justice-constituency is to
clearly articulate what that public purpose is at the global level,
instead of simply transposing ready-made purposes and rules from
national jurisdictions; the second is to formulate rules, norms, and
concepts that are carefully calibrated to achieve that public purpose.
It is quite conceivable that both the goals and the rules may,
with appropriate modification, be closer to the traditional ones of
increasing production of valued works. For developing intellectual property importing countries, however, it is equally plausible
that the public purpose may also embrace encouragement of importation of appropriate technology. 50 This, for instance, was the
principal role of the English patent system at its inception. It was
designed to encourage importation of crafts from overseas, and
the teaching of these to the locals; under both early English and
Venetian patents, validity of the patent was premised on the condition that the patented invention be worked in the country and
taught to local workmen. Indeed, the original patent term consisted of the normal period of apprenticeship-seven years-or
multiples of that period.5 '
6. CONCLUSION
The formulation of global intellectual property goals suggested here-namely, the articulation of a justice-constituencyshould be a top priority for rule makers. It is a project uniquely
amenable to multiple linkages. Once the basic structure is in
place, invisible hand effects may well step-in and configure the
deep integration, founded upon the concept of a justice constituency, into the greater complexity required of a modern global
market in products and information.
I do not remember all the stories from my Sunday school
class, but one that left an indelible impression on my mind is the
parable of the two builders: one wise, the other foolish. The wise
50 See, e.g., UN TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND MANAGEMENT
DIVISION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (New
York: United Nations, 1993) (documenting an apparent positive link between

effective intellectual property laws and the flow ot foreign investment).

51 See STANIFORTH RICKETSON, THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
861 1984).

As to the invisible hand effects, see the interesting account in ROBERT
NOZICK, SOCRATIC PUZZLES 191 (1997).
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builder labored long and hard to build a foundation for his house
on a rock. Not so the foolish one: Wanting to build quickly and
with minimum effort, he built his house on the sand, and for a
moment seemed the wiser of the two. But then the rain came
down, the streams rose and the winds blew and beat against the
houses. The wise man's house remained standing, but the foolish
man's fell and great was the fall of it. In building a global system
of intellectual property law, we might want to heed the parable of
the builders. We should not be afraid to engage in a little mapmaking, to stand back from the breathtaking manufacture of
global intellectual property rules in order to get a sense of perspective of the landscape upon which these rules are being
planted. A preliminary map-making of this kind is the only assurance that the global legal structure, now going up at such a
brisk pace, will have a firm foundation.

